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Cooperatives with strong property rights pay members lower prices than the other model, and are more efficient at discouraging over-fishing.
AUTHORS: Aburto-Oropeza, O., Leslie, H.M., Mack-Crane, A., Nagavarapu, S., Reddy, S.M. and Sievanen, L.
DATE: March 2016
Two different theories of cooperative management choices were empirically tested in the Gulf of California: that fishing cooperatives’ management choices are shaped by property rights, resource mobility, and predictable environments or by cooperatives paying lower prices and disincentivizing fishing effort. The study follows three cooperatives for three years: one cooperative enjoys property rights while the other two do not. It concluded that cooperatives with property rights pay a lower price than the other model, and are more efficient at discouraging over-fishing. As such, the paper demonstrated the viability of giving property-rights as a management tool for fishing cooperatives.